A note in defence of Boghossian’s epistemic analyticity
Keywords:
analyticity, Quine, Boghossian
Abstract
Boghossian (1996) develops and defends an epistemic notion of analyticity. In doing so he highlights the inherent difficulty of rejecting both meaning realism and analyticity. In this note I defend his argument against two attacks (Margolis & Laurence 2001; Harman 1996) that misconstrue his arguments in a way that does little except to facilitate unjustified dismissal.Downloads
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Published
2023-12-19
How to Cite
Smit, J. (2023). A note in defence of Boghossian’s epistemic analyticity. Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics Plus, 66(1), 219-227. https://doi.org/10.5842/66-1-979
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